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Leonard W. Levy* 
In 1976, on the Bicentennial anniversary of our founding docu-
ment, the Declaration of Independence, which celebrated life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness, the Supreme Court decided the 
case of New Orleans v. Dukes. I One might think that liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness include one's right to a livelihood, but no such 
right exists under the Constitution, according to Dukes. The Con-
stitution does not mention a right to livelihood, but it does not men-
tion a great many other rights that the Court has been ingenious 
enough to discover: a right to abortion; a right to pornography; a 
right to travel; a right to privacy; a right to association; a right to 
free counsel for indigents; a right to spread hatred; and a right of 
free speech for corporations. A Court that is so imaginative should 
be able to find the right to pursue a livelihood in the same Constitu-
tion. That right seems fundamental to liberty, and it should be ac-
cepted as a protected property right, too. 
Consider the facts in Dukes. They involved a woman who sold 
hot dogs from a pushcart in the French Quarter. If Nancy Dukes 
had been a nude dancer in one of the strip joints in the French 
Quarter and the City Council had put her out of business, she might 
have pleaded freedom of expression under the first amendment.2 
Nude dancing can be symbolic free speech, but selling hot dogs is 
just commerce, and therefore subject to little constitutional respect, 
even if it involves one's livelihood. 
Dukes had operated a licensed pushcart in the French Quarter 
for two years when the City Council banned all pushcarts except 
those operated by their owners for at least eight years. This ordi-
nance put only Dukes out of business but allowed two others to 
operate. The Fifth Circuit thought that the exclusion of Dukes de-
nied her the equal protection of the laws but the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed. In an unsigned opinion the Court said that 
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I. 427 u.s. 297 (1976). 
2. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); see also Young v. America 
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976). 
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the ordinance was "solely an economic regulation" designed for 
safeguarding the tourist charm of the French Quarter and thereby 
aiding the city's economy. The Court did not explain why a third 
pushcart would offend tourists or hurt the city's economy, but the 
point of its decision was that no such explanation is required when a 
mere economic right is at stake. "When local economic regulation 
is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this 
Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the de-
sirability of particular statutory discriminations. "3 The government 
regulation need only have some rational basis as a means of achiev-
ing some police power end. If an economic right is involved, the 
Court never questions the reasonableness of the government's 
means. Economic rights, especially those of individuals, are inferior 
rights. 
By contrast, if some regulation seems to threaten first amend-
ment rights or any of the rights of the criminally accused, or any of 
the rights that the Court has invented, like the right to an abortion 
or to travel, the Court subjects the regulation to strict scrutiny, 
reverses the presumption of constitutionality, and places upon the 
defender of the regulation the obligation of proving its constitution-
ality. In Dukes, however, the Court said that it will "not sit as a 
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative 
policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental 
rights nor proceed along suspect lines." Only once in the past half 
century had the Court held unconstitutional an economic regula-
tion as a denial of equal protection,4 and in Dukes the Court over-
ruled that precedent as a needlessly intrusive judicial infringement 
on the state's economic powers. In the same half century, not one 
state or local act of economic regulation was held unconstitutional 
based on a violation of due process of law. Like the corpse of John 
Randolph's mackerel, shining and stinking in the moonlight, eco-
nomic due process of law, the old substantive due process, is dead 
even as to personal rights in property. The Court has abdicated the 
responsibility of judicial review in such cases, although it has not in 
any other Bill of Rights cases.s 
3. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303. 
4. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
5. Another little case in the festive year of 1976 again illustrates. By a 7-1 vote the 
Court held that a state statute compelling the retirement of uniformed police officers at the 
age of fifty did not deny the equal protection of the law. The officer who sued to be reinstated 
to active duty had just passed a rigorous physical examination, and the doctors had pro-
nounced him to be in excellent physical and mental health. The Court, believing that fact to 
be irrelevant, held that its test of strictly scrutinizing a regulation applied only if a fundamen-
tal right was violated or if a suspect class was disadvantaged. The Court did not regard the 
right to work as a fundamental right, certainly not for a fifty-year-old cop if a legislature 
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The rational basis test, used only when property rights are con-
cerned and never for other rights, is inadequate. After all, the text 
of the Constitution explicitly protects property rights, not only by 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments but also through the fourth 
and seventh amendments, as well as with the contract clause and 
other provisions of article I, section ten. Yet the states can impose 
regulations on the entry of citizens into all sorts of jobs, requiring 
licenses from those who wish to be barbers, plumbers, masons, mor-
ticians, beekeepers, lawyers, bartenders, taxidermists, doctors, to 
name a few. Those who judge their qualifications are members of 
the guild or occupation, who prefer to keep competition down as 
well as standards up. About the only people who are unlicensed in 
California are clergymen and university professors, apparently be-
cause no one takes them seriously.6 
At one time, the Court did respect occupational rights. In 
1914, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited any-
one who had not been a brakeman from serving as a freight-train 
conductor. The act put many experienced conductors out of jobs. 
The ground of decision was the liberty of contract doctrine from the 
fourteenth amendment, a judicial invention derived from substan-
tive due process. Denial of equal protection also bothered the 
Court. It observed that depriving a man of his "right to labor" less-
ened "his capacity to earn wages and acquire property." Liberty, 
the Court said, means that "the citizen shall be protected in the 
right to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful calling." All 
men are "entitled to the equal protection of the law in their right to 
work for the support of themselves and their families."7 In a 1923 
case the Court expansively declared that the liberty protected by the 
fourteenth amendment denoted "the right of an individual to con-
tract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge [the right to an education?], to marry, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally 
to enjoy the privileges long recognized ... as essential to the pursuit 
of happiness by free men. "s That recalls a concurring opinion in 
the second Slaughter-house case, when Justice Joseph Bradley said 
that the right "to follow any of the common occupations is an ina-
lienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase 'pursuit 
thought otherwise, regardless of individual differences. And that ended it. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, dissenting, thought that the right to work ought not to be looked at in the same 
way that the Court looks at a mere economic regulation. Massachusetts Retirement Board v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
6. Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6,6 n.2 (1976). 
7. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636, 641 (1914) (emphasis added). 
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
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of happiness,' in the Declaration of Independence . . . . This right is 
a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen."9 That is what 
the constitutional law of the matter should be. Bradley spoke of the 
rights of people, not corporations. 
The Declaration of Independence is a starting point for mea-
suring the legacy that we inherited from the founders. Some schol-
ars argue that Jefferson and the Continental Congress discarded the 
Lockean trinity when they spoke instead of life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness as unalienable rights-"the pursuit of happiness, 
mind you, not property or estate," said Harry Jaffa, that preeminent 
scholar of the Declaration. 10 But Jefferson did not break with 
Locke. Jefferson knew Locke's ponderous Essay on Human Under-
standing, which used the exact phrase "pursuit of happiness." In a 
chapter on the 'Idea of Power," which is really about freedom, 
Locke used the phrase no less than four times and also used close 
equivalents several times. Locke wrote:tt 
Thus, how much soever men are in earnest and constant pursuit of happiness, 
yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed good, without being 
concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness 
without it .... 
A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness, no abridgement of 
liberty .... 
As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and 
constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so the care of ourselves, that we mis-
take not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty. 
The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is 
our greatest good ... we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happi-
ness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in partic-
ular cases. 
But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed, and 
we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness. 
The pursuit of happiness was the linchpin in Locke's political 
ethics. 
The phrase, as a matter of fact, was not uncommon in England 
before 1776. An anonymous author used it in 1703 in a book enti-
tled Civil Polity. William Wollaston, a rationalist writer, used it, 
and so did Francis Hutcheson the Scottish jurist, Oliver Goldsmith 
the novelist, Richard Price the nonconformist Whig, and even the 
anti-American Tory, Dr. Samuel Johnson, who used it at least three 
9. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 762 (1884). See also 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 109 (1873) (per Field, for four dissenters). 
10. Another Look at the Declaration, NAT'L REv., July II, 1980, at 840. 
II. I J. LOCKE, AN EssAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 342, 345, 348, 
355 (A. Fraser ed. 1894) (emphasis added); see also 2 id. at ch. XXI. Equivalents include 
"pursuit of our happiness," "pursuing happiness," "pursuit of true happiness," and "pursue 
happiness." 
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times. David Hume expressed a similar thought.12 William Black-
stone used a close equivalent of "pursuit of happiness" in his Com-
mentaries in 1765, when he said that God interwove the laws of 
eternal justice with the happiness of each individual and reduced 
the rule of obedience to one precept, "that man should pursue his 
own happiness. This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or 
naturallaw."D 
Closer to home, Richard Bland of Virginia, whom Jefferson 
knew and all patriot leaders read, cited Wollaston's use of "pursuit 
of happiness" in his 1766 Inquiry Into the Rights of the British Colo-
nies.l4 Jefferson owned a copy of Wollaston. James Wilson in his 
influential essay of 1774, which Jefferson admired, wrote that "[a]ll 
men are, by nature, equal and free. No one has a right to any au-
thority over another without his consent . . . . Such consent was 
given with a view to increase the happiness of the governed . . . . 
The consequence is, that the happiness of the society is the first law 
of every government."15 In the same year Josiah Quincy wrote that 
the purpose of government was to promote "the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number,"16 a thought expressed also by John Adams 
in 1776.17 The most significant precedent besides Locke was the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason a month 
before the Declaration of Independence and stating "[t]hat all men 
are created equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
natural rights of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or 
divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."1s That formulation 
is in many state constitutions, including California's. It was, in ex-
act words, the first amendment proposed by James Madison in 1789 
for a national Bill of Rights.19 Some scholars, including Henry 
Steele Commager, are so eager to show that Jefferson broke with 
12. For the principal research tracing the pre-1776 uses of "pursuit of happiness," see 
Gantner, Jefferson s 'Pursuit of Happiness' and Some Forgotten Men, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 558 
(2d ser. 1936)." 
13. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 40-41 (1765). 
14. R. BLAND, INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 8-9 (E. Swem 
rev. ed. 1922). 
15. Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of Par-
liament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 723 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
16. J. QUINCY, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF JOSIAH QUINCY, JR. 323 (1874) (quoting 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE AcT OF PARLIAMENT (1774)). 
17. Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 WORKS 193 (C. Adams ed. 1850-59). 
18. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAPTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS 3812 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). 
19. I THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
433 (June 8, 1789) (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834). 
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Locke that when they quote Mason's Declaration, they omit the 
property clause by using ellipsis marks.2o 
Jefferson's phrasing was more concise and felicitous than Ma-
son's, but Jefferson followed, rather than broke with, Locke in the 
"pursuit of happiness" phrasing. John Adams wrote that "there is 
not an idea" in the Declaration of Independence "but what had 
been hackneyed in Congress for two years before,"21 and Jefferson 
himself conceded that he had not intended to "invent new ideas"22 
"but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject ... it 
was intended to be an expression of the American mind."23 And so 
it was, including the familiar expression, "pursuit of happiness." If 
it meant an abandonment of the rights of property, Congress would 
not have accepted it. But it derived from Locke, whom Jefferson 
followed faithfully. 
Harry Jaffa says that life and liberty were valuable natural 
rights "because they culminated in the enjoyment and possession of 
property."24 That seems mistaken for two reasons. First, the prop-
osition seems backwards: property, in the sense that Professor Jaffa 
uses it, was a means of enjoying life and liberty. But one cannot 
push the point because liberty and property were viewed as so inter-
dependent that there is no knowing which was seen as a precondi-
tion of the other. As a writer in the Boston Gazette said in 1768, 
"Liberty and Property are not only joined in common discourse, 
but are in their own natures so nearly ally'd that we cannot be said 
to possess the one without the other. "25 And second, Locke did not 
mean property in the conventional way that Professor Jaffa does, 
namely, as one's estate or possessions with a market value. By 
property Locke also meant what Jefferson called the "pursuit of 
happiness." Locke was not consistent: he sometimes did mean the 
ownership of material things, but other times he meant by property 
a right to anything, not just a right to things; he meant a right to 
rights. In his Second Treatise, when he wrote that the chief reason 
that men made compacts for governance "is the preservation of 
20. Commager, The Pursuit of Happiness, 49 DIOGENES, 40, 53 (Spring 1965); Schaar, 
... And the Pursuit of Happiness, 46 VA. Q. REv. I, 5 (1970). 
21. Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (August 22, 1822), reprinted in 2 
WORKS, supra note 17, at 512. 
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August 30, 1823), reprinted in 15 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 46!-62 (A. Bergh ed. 1907) [hereinafter WRITINGS 
OF JEFFERSON]. 
23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), reprinted in !6 WRIT-
INGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 118-!9. 
24. H. JAFFA, HOW To THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 44 (1978). 
25. Boston Gazette, Feb. 2, 1768, quoted in C. RossiTER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 
379 (1953). 
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their property"-a remark some conservative scholars quote out of 
context26-Locke did not mean assets with a cash value. He said 
that men "united for the general preservation of their lives, liberties, 
and estates, which I call by the general name-property." And, he 
added, "by property I must be understood here as in other places to 
mean that property which men have in their persons as well as 
goods."27 
At least four times in his Second Treatise, Locke used the word 
"property" to mean all that belongs to a person, especially the 
rights that he wished to preserve.2s Americans of the founding gen-
eration understood property in this broad Lockean sense, which we 
have regrettably lost. They regarded property as a basic human 
right, essential to one's existence, to one's independence, to one's 
dignity as a person. Without property, real and personal, one could 
not enjoy life or liberty, and could not be free and independent. 
Only the property holder could make independent decisions and 
choices because he was not beholden to anyone; he had no need to 
be subservient. Americans cared about property not because they 
were materialistic but because they cared about political freedom 
and personal independence. They cherished property rights as pre-
requisites for the pursuit of happiness, and property opened up a 
world of intangible values-human dignity, self-regard, self-expres-
sion, and personal fulfillment. 
Political democracy cannot function without job-holding, 
property-owning, masterless citizens. Every time that a bank fore-
closes on a family farm, every time that an honest, hardworking 
shopkeeper goes into bankruptcy, and every time that some aspir-
ing, able person loses his or her livelihood because some state-ap-
proved occupational board denies a license, political democracy dies 
a little. Private property owned by individuals, not corporations, is 
the bulwark of a free society. 
Why then did the Declaration of Independence not say "life, 
liberty and property"? Why substitute "pursuit of happiness" for 
"property"? Aside from Jefferson's sense of style, he had two sub-
stantive reasons. First, he meant property in its broadest sense and 
he wanted to avoid ambiguity. Second, he was listing "unalienable" 
rights, and he did not believe in the unalienability of possessions, or 
property as estate. It was a natural right; it was indispensable; but 
it was not unalienable. Locke was no more a spokesman for corpo-
26. Charles R. Kessler, in H. JAFFA, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING 7 (1984); L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 234, 245 (1935). 
27. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT§§ 123, 173 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) 
(3d ed. 1698); see also id. at § 87 11.5-6 and accompanying notes. 
28. !d. at §§ 27, 87, 123, 173. 
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rate capitalism than he was for collectivism. He believed, and Jef-
ferson agreed, that property had limits. When he spoke of a person 
gathering acorns or apples, and by his labor earning an entitlement 
to property, he was speaking of the state of nature, not of civil 
society. 
Locke had little to say about property in civil society. When 
he concluded his chapter on property by referring to the emergence 
of money in civil society and to the legitimacy of heaping up money, 
he stated that communities regulated private property in civil soci-
ety. "For in Governments," he wrote, "the Laws regulate the right 
to property, and the possession of land is determined by positive 
constitutions."29 In a state of nature, property could not be be-
queathed. The point is that property is a creature of civil society. 
Leo Strauss rejected that point, yet he acknowledged Locke's belief 
that "once civil society is formed, if not before, the natural law re-
garding property ceases to be valid; what we may call 'conventional' 
or 'civil' property-the property which is owned within civil soci-
ety-is based on positive law alone."3o But to acknowledge that 
Locke endorsed the right to accumulate as much property as possi-
ble in any way "permitted by the positive law" is to acknowledge 
that property is alienable.31 Even in a state of nature, property 
rights had limits: a man had no right to own more than he could 
cultivate and consume, certainly not at the expense of others. 
Whether or not Locke believed that property was alienable in 
civil society, Jefferson surely believed that property was the product 
of civil society and was alienable. In his Tract on Property, Lord 
Kames thought so, and Jefferson approvingly copied Kames in his 
Common-Place Book. Thomas Paine thought property was a civil 
right that could be regulated for the common good, and Jefferson 
agreed.32 As he once said, ownership "is the gift of social law, and 
is given late in the progress of society," a reminder that we should 
not take literally Locke's social compact theory.33 Jefferson did not 
believe in the theory that ownership derives from natural law and 
that government could not create and regulate it. Witness his suc-
cessful assault on primogeniture and entail. 
This view of property as a human right is the theme of a re-
markable paper by the father of the Constitution and of the Bill of 
29. J. LOCKE, supra note 27, at § 50. 
30. L. STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 235. 
31. Jd. at 241. 
32. G. CHINARD, THE COMMON-PLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 107 (1926); G. 
CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM 80-83 (2d ed. 1939). 
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in 13 
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 333. 
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Rights, James Madison. In 1792 he wrote his essay on Property. In 
Lockean terms he described what he called the "larger and juster 
meaning" of the term "property." It "embraces," he said, "every 
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right." In the 
narrow sense, it meant one's land, merchandise, or money; in the 
broader sense "a man has property in his opinions and the free com-
munication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his 
religious opinions, and in the profession and practices dictated by 
them. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and 
free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, as a 
man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to 
have a property in his rights. "34 
When agrarian capitalism predominated, the United States 
could easily celebrate property as Jefferson and Madison under-
stood the term because most people were or meant to become in-
dependent freehold farmers who thought that they controlled their 
destiny. When industrial and financial capitalism became the gov-
erning institutions and the corporation became their major form, 
the meaning of "property" reverted to its cash nexus. The narrow, 
surviving meaning was the one that the Supreme Court adopted 
from the beginning. In 1795, Justice William Paterson, one of the 
framers, proclaimed the judicial power to hold unconstitutional any 
legislative act repugnant to the Constitution. In the case before 
him, Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, he described the right to ac-
quire and hold property, real or personal, as an unalienable as well 
as a natural right, the primary object of the social compact. He 
held that the power of government to take property when state ne-
cessity requires was "despotic." He censured the government's 
seizure of the land of one citizen, even for just compensation, to give 
it to others. It was immaterial to the government, he said, in which 
of its citizens land was vested; once vested, however, it was inviola-
ble. "The Constitution encircles, and renders it an holy thing .... 
It is sacred."Js 
Within about a century a property-minded judiciary had run 
amok, inventing judicial doctrines to protect corporate interests 
from public regulation. Brooks Adams had good reason to say, in a 
1913 book, that "[t]he Capitalist ... regards the constitutional form 
of government which exists in the United States as a convenient 
method of obtaining his own way against a majority .... "36 For a 
34. National Gazette (Philadelphia), March 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS oF 
JAMES MADISON 266 (C. Hobson, R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1986). 
35. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (1795). 
36. B. ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION 214 (1914). 
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time the Court incorporated the contract clause, which was origi-
nally a limitation on the states only, into the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment. As a result, Congress had no constitutional 
power to require a corporation, to which the United States had lent 
money, to set aside a fund to repay its debt to the government.37 
The Court also incorporated the eminent domain or takings clause 
of the fifth amendment into the fourteenth, so that state regulatory 
commissions could not fix rates that significantly reduced corporate 
profits.3s The Court dictated to administrative tribunals, state and 
federal, how to fix rates using absurd economic formulae. The 
Court invented the liberty of contract doctrine as a means of secur-
ing capital against state interferences with employer-employee rela-
tionships, and it struck down minimum wage and maximum hours 
laws as unconstitutionaJ.39 
By 1936 a conservative Court had created a twilight zone 
within which government power did not exist; neither states nor 
federal government could constitutionally enact regulatory mea-
sures to combat the Great Depression. Congress could not use the 
commerce power to regulate labor standards and labor relations be-
cause they were local matters falling within state jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, the states could not regulate those matters without 
violating the Court's liberty of contract doctrine.40 The Court 
shaped constitutional law so that employers were free to exploit 
workers in accord with so-called laws of supply and demand and 
free competition, laws that never prevailed if they hobbled en-
trepreneurial profits. 
The Court had discredited itself by its excesses and biases. 
Franklin Roosevelt blundered by attempting to pack the Court by 
statute, but his assault on the Court prompted the scales to drop 
from the eyes of Justice Owen Roberts. He simply changed his 
mind-the switch in time that saved nine. As a result, without a 
single change on the membership of the Court, a constitutional 
revolution was underway, and the rational basis test emerged as the 
dominating feature of constitutional law in any case involving eco-
37. In re Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1878); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 623-24 (1869). 
38. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
39. S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE ch. 5 (1956); R. 
HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 
(1952); C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS (1954); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRI-
SIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960); B. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How 
LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). 
40. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Morehead v. New York ex rei. 
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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nomic regulation.4t 
Judicial irresponsibility had led to judicial abdication. Not 
even the most conservative Justices on today's Supreme Court ques-
tion the constitutionality of government control of the economy. 
There are no longer any limits on the commerce power of Con-
gress.42 Whether we have a government-managed economy or even 
a socialist state is a question of policy to be decided by the voters at 
the polls; it is no longer a question of constitutional limitations. 
There are none in the economic realm. The government can take 
apart even the greatest corporations, like Ma Bell; if it does not 
proceed against General Dynamics or other giants, the reason is to 
be found in national defense needs and in politics, not in the Consti-
tution. The states are supplicants before the United States govern-
ment, beneficiaries of its largesse like so many welfare recipients, 
unable to control their own policies, serving instead as administra-
tive agencies of federal policies. 
Those federal policies extend to realms not remotely within the 
federal power to govern under the Constitution, except for the fact 
that the spending power, so-called, the power to spend for national 
defense and general welfare can be exercised through programs of 
grants-in-aid to states and to over 75,000 substate governmental en-
tities; they take federal tax money and obediently enforce the condi-
tions laid down by Congress and by federal agencies for control of 
the expenditures. Federalism as we knew it has been replaced by a 
new federalism that even conservative Republican administrations 
enforce.43 The government today makes the New Deal look like a 
backer of Adam Smith's legendary free enterprise and a respecter of 
John C. Calhoun's state sovereignty. 
Even conservative Justices accept the new order of things. Jus-
tice William Rehnquist spoke for the Court in Prune Yard, and Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor spoke in Hawaii Housing Authority; the 
Court was unanimous in both. In the first of these cases, decided in 
1980, the Court held that a state may require a shopping center 
owner to allow solicitation of petition signatures on his premises. 
Rehnquist saw a reasonable police power regulation of private prop-
erty and reminded us that the public right to regulate the use of 
41. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and 
Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REV. 446 (1951). 
42. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 
ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1973). 
43. A. HOWITT, MANAGING FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RE-
LATIONS (1984); M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (2d ed. 1981); D. WALKER, TOWARD 
A FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM (1981 ). The generalizations are mine; the works cited here 
supply the facts. 
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property is as fundamental as the right to property itself.44 One 
might have thought that as a matter of constitutional theory, the 
property right was fundamental and that the regulatory power was 
an exception to it that had to be justified. Rehnquist did not explain 
why the regulation was justifiable or reasonable; under the rational 
basis test the Court has no obligation to explain anything. It only 
need believe that the legislature had some reason for its regulation. 
In Hawaiian Housing Authority, the Court unanimously held 
that the state could do the very thing that Justice Paterson had said 
it could not do-take property from one citizen, even at a just com-
pensation, and give it to another at that price.4s Land ownership in 
Hawaii was concentrated in a few people; to break the oligopoly of 
ownership the state fixed on a scheme whereby it took private prop-
erty by eminent domain, lent tenants up to 90% of the purchase 
price, and arranged for transfer of titles. But the Constitution states 
that property may be taken at a just price only for a public use. 
Anyone who thinks that means an arsenal, a courthouse, a school, 
or a fire station is as naive as Justice Paterson. 
Justice O'Connor identified a public use with a public purpose, 
equating the power of eminent domain with the police power. She 
proclaimed the need for judicial deference to legislatures, because 
legislatures are better able than courts to assess what public pur-
poses should be promoted by eminent domain. Certainly an appro-
priation or taking of property for a public use may have a public 
purpose, like satisfying the need for an airfield or for a public dump, 
but vesting the title of land in private parties does not constitute a 
public purpose or a public use. The public use requirement, 
O'Connor said, is "coterminous with the scope of the sovereign's 
police powers." This case teaches that wherever an oligopoly exists, 
whether in the making of automobiles or disposable diapers, the 
voters can decide to transfer ownership to the workers in the indus-
try by taking the property, selling it to the employees, and financing 
the loan they need to make the purchase. 
On the Court's side is the fact that it made no new law in the 
1984 case. The pre-Civil War history of eminent domain shows 
that the power was used to take property for railroads and other so-
called public works or public utilities, which were privately 
owned.46 But those companies were subject to rate regulation and 
government controls, from which other private property was ex-
44. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
45. Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
46. Levy, Chief Justice Shaw and the Formative Period of American Railroad Law (pts. 
1-2), 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 327, 852 (1951). Part I of the article deals with eminent domain; 
Part II deals with railroads as comon carriers or public works. 
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empt. Also on the Court's side is the fact that nothing was new in 
its equating the police power with the power of eminent domain. 
That foolishness had been going on since at least 1897. Whenever 
the Court used its own subjective standards and found that some 
regulation was excessive, it condemned the regulation as a taking.47 
In a case that shows how the Court abused its power for the benefit 
of utilities, it held that a schedule of rates that permitted the com-
pany to earn a profit of 6.26 percent was unconstitutional. The 
Court held that rates returning "7.5 percent, or even 8 percent" 
would be "necessary to avoid confiscation. "48 In these old cases, 
however, the Court held that the rate regulations were unconstitu-
tional, amounting to an excessive use of the police power, rather 
than a violation of the eminent domain clause, which would have 
required compensation for confiscation or a taking. 
Regulations designed to promote the public health, safety, 
morals, or interests should not necessarily be regarded as takings 
even if the regulation is excessive, so long as the government does 
not appropriate the property or make any use of it, and it remains in 
the possession of the owner, whose title has not been transferred or 
damaged. The fact remains, however, that the Court has long re-
garded excessive regulation as a taking. The striking difference be-
tween the early cases and the 1984 one is that the Court had 
invented its doctrine that an excessive regulation is a taking in order 
to protect rights of owners, whereas the Court in 1984 used the 
same doctrine against owners and in favor of the police power. 
A Lockean liberal can accept the 1984 decision because it ad-
vanced the cause of individual ownership. What puzzles me is the 
failure of conservatives, on and off the Court, to criticize an opinion 
that is so hostile to property and that distorts the plain meaning of 
the constitutional text, which speaks of taking for a public "use," 
not for a public purpose. After all, conservatives supposedly cher-
ish both the text and a jurisprudence of original intent. 
We have arrived at a peculiar constitutional stance after two 
47. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Chicago, B&Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 239 (1897). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Justice Holmes 
for the Court said, "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." /d. at 415. See also 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), a direct precedent for sustaining an act that takes 
property from A and sells it to B. On the general subject, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Dunham, Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. 
CT. REV. 63; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights (pts. 1&2), 74 YALE L.J. 36 
(1964), 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
48. United Rys. and Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1930). 
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hundred years. Once we believed with John Dickinson and the 
founders that a free government is not one which exercises its pow-
ers reasonably but one that is so constitutionally checked that it 
must exercise its powers reasonably.49 
Once, Jefferson and Madison, in connection with the bill to 
charter the Bank of the United States, had argued that if the power 
to spend were construed as independent of the enumerated powers, 
we should have a government of virtually unlimited powers. Ham-
ilton did not argue the point on that occasion but did so later.so In 
1935 Justice Owen Roberts for the reactionary majority of the 
Court, accepted Hamilton's argument on the power to spend, and in 
1937 the liberals also embraced Hamilton.s• There are no constitu-
tional limits on the spending power today, and no power has more 
radically transformed American federalism. 
Property rights have fallen from judicial grace, but not all 
property rights, because some are more equal than others. Corpo-
rate property is more equal than individual property. Purely pri-
vate property is more equal than property affected by a public 
interest-a discredited term. Property deriving from fee simple or 
outright ownership is more equal than property deriving from statu-
tory entitlement. Purely private property is more equal than private 
property publicly employed. Consider the case of the privately 
owned, powerful newspaper, the Miami Herald, which disparaged a 
person in print. The paper had a constitutional right to freedom of 
the press and no obligation to provide free space in its pages to its 
victim.s2 But when a small radio station, also privately owned, dis-
paraged a person, its first amendment rights did not prevail and it 
had no obligation to provide equal time to its victim, apparently 
because the public owns the airwaves; the public does not own the 
Miami Herald, but neither does it own that radio station.53 
Consider too the case of the welfare recipient whose home 
could be searched without a warrant and without probable cause if 
an administrative official decided to invade the premises to deter-
mine whether a welfare-assisted child was receiving proper care; re-
49. Dickinson. Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, in I WRITINGS OF JOHN DICK-
INSON 356 (P. Ford ed. 1895) (1st ed. 1768) (Letter VII in Vol. XIV of Memoirs of the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania). 
50. 3 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 22, at 147-48; I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: 
FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, at 324 (1950); 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 302-04 (H. Syrett ed. 1961). 
51. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950); Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 65-66 (1936). See supra 
note 43 and accompanying text. 
52. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
53. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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fusal to admit a state official results in forfeiture of the 
entitlement.s4 The fact that the welfare recipient received govern-
ment handouts should not make her property any less private than 
that of a farmer or a business receiving government subsidies. 
Nothing but a double standard explains the state of our constitu-
tional law. The fourth amendment applied, as it should have, when 
an agent of the Secretary of Labor attempted to make a warrantless 
search of the property of a corporation in order to determine 
whether it was complying with standards of safety required by fed-
eral law. The Court held unconstitutional a provision of Congress's 
Occupational Safety and Health Act insofar as it authorized inspec-
tions without a warrant. The Court failed to explain why the wel-
fare recipient's home was not entitled to the same protection against 
government intrusion as the business enterprise. The cases show 
that one must own property to enjoy rights, and, it seems, the more 
property one has, especially in corporate form, the more rights it 
buys. Constitutional law loves fictions, so it makes believe that the 
principle of equality has not been offended. For example, we can 
spend all we want to advertise or promote our views, and so can a 
corporation; the only difference is that we spend our own money 
and can reach few people, while the great corporations spend corpo-
rate monies in their exercise of their first amendment rights and can 
reach the nation.ss 
One who owns the right kind of property is freer than one who 
owns property but not the right kind. One who owns any kind of 
property is freer than one who owns none or very little. Property 
today, like 200 years ago, remains necessary for political liberty and 
individual independence. The Court made a mistake fifty years ago: 
it should not have employed the rational basis test in cases of eco-
nomic regulation involving property as a human right. The Court 
should learn to distinguish the rights of people from the rights of 
business enterprises. Strict judicial scrutiny is called for when per-
sonal rights of property are at issue. Congress, for example, can 
regulate major league baseball if it wishes, but if it touches the free 
agency clause, crimping the right of the players to make top dollar, 
the Court should apply the same standard as it would in a first 
amendment case. Making a living is fundamental to one's per-
sonhood and stake in society. Free speech is of little value to a 
propertyless person. With the exception of freedom of religion, 
nothing is more important than work and a chance at a career or a 
decent living. 
54. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
55. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
184 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:169 
Every now and then we get some little case that shows aston-
ishing perception, even if it is promptly forgotten. Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corporation in 1972 was such a case. A woman's 
savings account was garnished under state law for alleged nonpay-
ment of a loan. She received no notice, no chance to be heard, obvi-
ously a denial of due process. She sued in federal district court but 
the court dismissed her suit, ruling that only personal rights merited 
a judicial hearing, not property rights. The Supreme Court, divid-
ing 4-3, reversed the district court. Justice Potter Stewart for the 
liberal plurality (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall), made this rare 
and wise observation: 
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop-
erty does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without 
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth 
a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, 
or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the 
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have 
meaning without the other. 56 
Citing Locke, John Adams, and Blackstone's Commentaries, Stew-
art added: "That rights in property are basic civil rights has long 
been recognized."s1 If that were true, we would not have the 
double standard: strict scrutiny for all rights but property, a ra-
tional basis test for property. 
No principled reason exists for the Court's refusal to ask 
whether a statute curtailing personal rights in property is in fact a 
significant means of achieving a legitimate police power objective, 
and whether it achieves that objective without unnecessarily bur-
dening private rights. There is no legitimate basis for perfunctory 
scrutiny in such cases. Property owned by people should be ac-
corded the same constitutional respect that courts give to other civil 
or human rights so essential to the pursuit of happiness.ss 
56. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). 
57. /d. 
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